Optimal Primaries

Patrick Hummel and Richard Holden

No 19340, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We analyze a model of US presidential primary elections for a given party. There are two candidates, one of whom is a higher quality candidate. Voters reside in m different states and receive noisy private information about the identity of the superior candidate. States vote in some order, and this order is chosen by a social planner. We provide conditions under which the ordering of the states that maximizes the probability that the higher quality candidate is elected is for states to vote in order from smallest to largest populations and most accurate private information to least accurate private information.

JEL-codes: D47 D71 D72 K19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cta, nep-ore and nep-pol
Note: LE POL
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published as Hummel, Patrick & Holden, Richard, 2014. "Optimal primaries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 64-75.

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