How do CEOs see their Role? Management Philosophy and Styles in Family and Non-Family Firms

William Mullins and Antoinette Schoar

No 19395, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Using a survey of 800 CEOs in 22 emerging economies we show that CEOs' management styles and philosophy vary with the control rights and involvement of the owning family and founder: CEOs of firms with greater family involvement have more hierarchical management, and feel more accountable to stakeholders such as employees and banks than they do to shareholders. They also see their role as maintaining the status quo rather than bringing about change. In contrast, professional CEOs of non-family firms display a more textbook approach of shareholder-value-maximization. Finally, we find a continuum of leadership arrangements in how intensively family members are involved in management.

JEL-codes: G3 G32 J62 M5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cse and nep-hrm
Note: CF LS PR
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Published as Journal of Financial Economics Volume 119, Issue 1, January 2016, Pages 24–43 Cover image How do CEOs see their roles? Management philosophies and styles in family and non-family firms ☆ William Mullinsa, 1, , Antoinette Schoarb,

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