Conforming and Non-conforming Peer Effects in Vaccination Decisions

Elizabeth Bodine-Baron, Sarah Nowak, Raffaello Varadavas and Neeraj Sood

No 19528, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Traditional economic models of vaccination assume that agents free-ride on the vaccination decision of others. These models show that private vaccination rates are always below the social optimal and even large subsidies cannot achieve disease eradication. In this paper, we build a model where in addition to the desire to free-ride, agents have a desire to conform to the vaccination decisions of their peers. In this model privately optimal vaccination rates can be higher or lower than the social optimal and thus subsidies for vaccination are not always optimal. However, in certain cases, even small subsidies can achieve disease eradication.

JEL-codes: H2 H21 I1 I28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea, nep-net and nep-ure
Note: EH
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