Enforcement and Immigrant Location Choice

Tara Watson

No 19626, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper investigates the effect of local immigration enforcement regimes on the migration decisions of the foreign born. Specifically, the analysis uses individual level American Community Survey data to examine the effect of recent 287(g) agreements which allow state and local law enforcement agencies to enforce Federal immigration law. The results suggest that one type of 287(g) agreement - the controversial local "task force" model emphasizing street enforcement - nearly doubles the propensity for the foreign-born to relocate within the United States. The largest effects are observed among non-citizens with college education, suggesting that aggressive enforcement policies may be missing their intended targets. No similar effect is found for the native born. After the extreme case of Maricopa County is excluded, there is no evidence that local enforcement causes the foreign-born to exit the United States or deters their entry from abroad. Rather, 287(g) task force agreements encourage the foreign born to move to a new Census division or region within the United States.

JEL-codes: J15 J18 K37 R23 R28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mig and nep-ure
Note: EH LE LS PE
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (42)

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Working Paper: Enforcement and immigrant location choice (2013)
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