Does Planning Regulation Protect Independent Retailers?

Raffaella Sadun

No 19797, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Regulations aimed at curbing the entry of large retail stores have been introduced in many countries to protect independent retailers. Analyzing a planning reform launched in the United Kingdom in the 1990s, I show that independent retailers were actually harmed by the creation of entry barriers against large stores. Instead of simply reducing the number of new large stores entering a market, the entry barriers created the incentive for large retail chains to invest in smaller and more centrally located formats, which competed more directly with independents and accelerated their decline. Overall, these findings suggest that restricting the entry of large stores does not necessarily lead to a world with fewer stores, but one with different stores, with uncertain competitive effects on independent retailers.

JEL-codes: K2 L10 L51 L81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-reg
Note: PR
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Published as Raffaella Sadun, 2015. "Does Planning Regulation Protect Independent Retailers?," Review of Economics and Statistics, vol 97(5), pages 983-1001.

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Related works:
Journal Article: Does Planning Regulation Protect Independent Retailers? (2015)
Working Paper: Does planning regulation protect independent retailers? (2008)
Working Paper: Does Planning Regulation Protect Independent Retailers? (2008)
Working Paper: Does planning regulation protect independent retailers? (2008)
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