Special Interests and the Media: Theory and an Application to Climate Change

Jesse Shapiro

No 19807, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: A journalist reports to a voter on an unknown, policy-relevant state. Competing special interests can make claims that contradict the facts but seem credible to the voter. A reputational incentive to avoid taking sides leads the journalist to report special interests’ claims to the voter. In equilibrium, the voter can remain uninformed even when the journalist is perfectly informed. Communication is improved if the journalist discloses her partisan leanings. The model provides an account of persistent public ignorance on climate change that is consistent with narrative and quantitative evidence.

JEL-codes: D72 D83 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-env and nep-pol
Note: EEE PE POL
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Published as Jesse M. Shapiro, 2016. "Special Interests and the Media: Theory and an Application to Climate Change," Journal of Public Economics, .

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w19807.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Special interests and the media: Theory and an application to climate change (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19807

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w19807

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().