Why Has U.S. Policy Uncertainty Risen Since 1960?

Scott Baker, Nicholas Bloom, Brandice Canes-Wrone, Steven Davis and Jonathan A. Rodden

No 19826, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: There appears to be a strong upward drift in policy-related economic uncertainty after 1960. We consider two classes of explanations for this rise. The first stresses growth in government spending, taxes, and regulation. A second stresses increased political polarization and its implications for the policy-making process and policy choices. While the evidence is inconclusive, it suggests that both factors play a role in driving the secular increase in policy uncertainty over the last half century.

JEL-codes: D7 E02 E6 H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his and nep-mac
Note: EFG PE POL
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (74)

Published as Scott R. Baker & Nicholas Bloom & Brandice Canes-Wrone & Steven J. Davis & Jonathan Rodden, 2014. "Why Has US Policy Uncertainty Risen since 1960?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(5), pages 56-60, May.

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