Present-Bias, Procrastination and Deadlines in a Field Experiment

Alberto Bisin and Kyle Hyndman

No 19874, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We study procrastination in the context of a field experiment involving students who must exert costly effort to complete certain tasks by a fixed deadline. Descriptively, we document a strong demand for commitment, in the form of self-imposed deadlines, which appear to be associated with students' self-reported psychological characteristics and cost of time. We structurally estimate students' present-bias and cost of time by fitting the experimental data to a stylized stopping time choice model. We find that present-bias is relatively widespread but that having multiple repeated tasks appears to activate effective internal self-control mechanisms. Finally, we also document an important form of partial naïveté on the part of students in anticipating their ability to self-control when setting deadlines.

JEL-codes: D03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-exp
Note: CH ED
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)

Published as Alberto Bisin & Kyle Hyndman, 2019. "Present-bias, procrastination and deadlines in a field experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, .

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Journal Article: Present-bias, procrastination and deadlines in a field experiment (2020)
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