Election Fairness and Government Legitimacy in Afghanistan
Eli Berman (),
Clark Gibson and
James D. Long
No 19949, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
International development agencies invest heavily in institution building in fragile states, including expensive interventions to support democratic elections. Yet little evidence exists on whether elections enhance the domestic legitimacy of governments. Using the random assignment of an innovative election fraud-reducing intervention in Afghanistan, we find that decreasing electoral misconduct improves multiple survey measures of attitudes toward government, including: (1) whether Afghanistan is a democracy; (2) whether the police should resolve disputes; (3) whether members of parliament provide services; and (4) willingness to report insurgent behavior to security forces.
JEL-codes: H41 O10 O17 O53 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Published as Eli Berman & Michael Callen & Clark C. Gibson & James D. Long & Arman Rezaee, 2019. "Election fairness and government legitimacy in Afghanistan," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, .
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