The Role of Sales Agents in Information Disclosure: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Hunt Allcott and Richard Sweeney

No 20048, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: With a large nationwide retailer, we run a natural field experiment to measure the effects of energy use information disclosure, customer rebates, and sales agent incentives on demand for energy efficient durable goods. While a combination of large rebates plus sales incentives substantially increases market share, information and sales incentives alone each have zero statistical effect and explain at most a small fraction of the low baseline market share. Sales agents strategically comply only partially with the experiment, targeting information at more interested consumers but not discussing energy efficiency with the disinterested majority. These results suggest that at current prices in this context, seller-provided information is not a major barrier to energy efficiency investments. We theoretically and empirically explore the novel policy option of combining customer subsidies with government-provided sales incentives.

JEL-codes: D04 D12 L15 L51 L68 Q48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-ene and nep-exp
Note: EEE
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published as Hunt Allcott & Richard L. Sweeney, 2017. "The Role of Sales Agents in Information Disclosure: Evidence from a Field Experiment," Management Science, vol 63(1), pages 21-39.

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