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The Twin Ds: Optimal Default and Devaluation

Seunghoon Na, Stephanie Schmitt-Grohe, Martín Uribe () and Vivian Yue

No 20314, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: A salient characteristic of sovereign defaults is that they are typically accompanied by large devaluations. This paper presents new evidence of this empirical regularity known as the Twin Ds and proposes a model that rationalizes it as an optimal policy outcome. The model combines limited enforcement of debt contracts and downward nominal wage rigidity. Under optimal policy, default is shown to occur during con- tractions. The role of default is to free up resources for domestic absorption, and the role of exchange-rate devaluation is to lower the real value of wages, thereby reducing involuntary unemployment.

JEL-codes: E52 F31 F34 F38 F41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-mac and nep-opm
Note: EFG IFM ME
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

Published as Seunghoon Na & Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé & Martín Uribe & Vivian Yue, 2018. "The Twin Ds: Optimal Default and Devaluation," American Economic Review, vol 108(7), pages 1773-1819.

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