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Worker Mobility in a Global Labor Market: Evidence from the United Arab Emirates

Suresh Naidu, Yaw Nyarko and Shing-Yi Wang

No 20388, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: In 2011, a reform in the United Arab Emirates allowed any employer to renew a migrant's visa upon contract expiration without written permission from the initial employer. We find that the reform increased incumbent migrants' earnings and firm retention of these workers. This occurs despite an increase in employer transitions, and is driven by a fall in country exits. While the outcomes of workers already in the United Arab Emirates improved, our analysis suggests that the reform decreased demand for new migrant workers and lowered their earnings. These results are consistent with a model in which the reform reduces the monopsony power of firms.

JEL-codes: J42 J6 O15 O53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ara, nep-dem, nep-lab, nep-lma and nep-mig
Note: DEV LS
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Published as Monopsony Power in Migrant Labor Markets: Evidence from the United Arab Emirates Suresh Naidu, Yaw Nyarko, and Shing-Yi Wang Journal of Political Economy 2016 124:6, 1735-1792

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