Damming the Commons: An Empirical Analysis of International Cooperation and Conflict in Dam Location

Sheila M. Olmstead and Hilary Sigman

No 20389, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper examines whether countries consider the welfare of other nations when they make water development decisions. We estimate econometric models of the location of major dams around the world as a function of the degree of international sharing of rivers. We find that dams are more prevalent in areas of river basins some distance upstream of foreign countries, supporting the view that countries free ride in exploiting water resources. We find some evidence that international institutions, in particular multinational financing and international water management treaties, may mitigate this free riding.

JEL-codes: F53 Q25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr and nep-env
Note: EEE PE
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published as Sheila M. Olmstead & Hilary Sigman, 2015. "Damming the Commons: An Empirical Analysis of International Cooperation and Conflict in Dam Location," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(4), pages 497 - 526.

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Related works:
Journal Article: Damming the Commons: An Empirical Analysis of International Cooperation and Conflict in Dam Location (2015)
Working Paper: Damming the Commons: An Empirical Analysis of International Cooperation and Conflict in Dam Location (2014)
Working Paper: Damming the Commons: An Empirical Analysis of International Cooperation and Conflict in Dam Location (2014)
Working Paper: Damming the commons: an empirical analysis of international cooperation and conflict in dam location (2014)
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