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Tax Morale

Erzo Luttmer () and Monica Singhal ()

No 20458, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Standard economic models of tax compliance have focused on enforcement-driven compliance. Notably, tax administrators also tend to place a great deal of emphasis on the importance of improving "tax morale" by encouraging voluntary compliance, creating a culture of compliance, and changing social norms. Tax morale does indeed appear to be an important component of compliance decisions, and there is strong evidence that tax morale operates through a variety of underlying channels. There is less evidence - to date - that indicates we know how to leverage these channels to improve compliance and revenue collection in a consistently successful way.

JEL-codes: H26 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-iue, nep-pbe and nep-pub
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Published as Erzo F. P. Luttmer & Monica Singhal, 2014. "Tax Morale," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 28(4), pages 149-68, Fall.

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