The Economics of Attribute-Based Regulation: Theory and Evidence from Fuel-Economy Standards

Koichiro Ito and James Sallee

No 20500, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper analyzes "attribute-based regulations," in which regulatory compliance depends upon some secondary attribute that is not the intended target of the regulation. For example, in many countries fuel-economy standards mandate that vehicles have a certain fuel economy, but heavier or larger vehicles are allowed to meet a lower standard. Such policies create perverse incentives to distort the attribute upon which compliance depends. We develop a theoretical framework to predict how actors will respond to attribute-based regulations and to characterize the welfare implications of these responses. To test our theoretical predictions, we exploit quasi-experimental variation in Japanese fuel economy regulations, under which fuel-economy targets are downward-sloping step functions of vehicle weight. Our bunching analysis reveals large distortions to vehicle weight induced by the policy. We then leverage panel data on vehicle redesigns to empirically investigate the welfare implications of attribute-basing, including both potential benefits and likely costs. This latter analysis concerns a "double notched" policy; vehicles are eligible for an incentive if they are above a step function in the two-dimensional fuel economy by weight space. We develop a procedure for analyzing the response to such policies that is new to the literature.

JEL-codes: H23 L62 Q48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-reg and nep-tre
Note: EEE PE
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

Published as Koichiro Ito & James M. Sallee, 2018. "The Economics of Attribute-Based Regulation: Theory and Evidence from Fuel Economy Standards," The Review of Economics and Statistics, vol 100(2), pages 319-336.

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Economics of Attribute-Based Regulation: Theory and Evidence from Fuel Economy Standards (2018)
Working Paper: The Economics of Attribute-Based Regulation: Theory and Evidence from Fuel-Economy Standards (2015)
Working Paper: The Economics of Attribute-Based Regulation: Theory and evidence from fuel-economy standards (2014)
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