Robust Benchmark Design

Darrell Duffie and Piotr Dworczak

No 20540, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Recent scandals over the manipulation of LIBOR, foreign exchange benchmarks, and other financial benchmarks have spurred policy discussions over their appropriate design. We characterize the optimal fixing of a benchmark as an estimator of a market value or reference rate. The fixing data are the reports or transactions of agents whose profits depend on the fixing, and who may therefore have incentives to manipulate it. If the benchmark administrator cannot detect or deter the strategic splitting of trades, we show that the best linear unbiased fixing is the commonly used volume-weighted average price (VWAP).

JEL-codes: D82 G12 G14 G18 G23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-10
Note: AP
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

Published as Duffie, Darrell & Dworczak, Piotr, 2021. "Robust benchmark design," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 142(2), pages 775-802.

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Journal Article: Robust benchmark design (2021)
Working Paper: Robust Benchmark Design (2014)
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