A Theory of Minimalist Democracy

Chris Bidner, Patrick Francois () and Francesco Trebbi

No 20552, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: A majority of the world democracies are far from the benchmark of representative democracy. This paper presents a model of political transitions based on a minimalist conception of the democratic state, i.e. a form of government solely characterized by competitive elections. We show that the model can produce dynamics of transition into democracy without requiring any role for redistribution or representation of voters, but solely based on interactions among the ruling elites. This allows the model to match several relevant stylized facts concerning the organization of new and consolidating democracies, weakly institutionalized countries, and hybrid regimes.

JEL-codes: H11 P16 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
Note: DEV POL
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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