The Collateral Trap

Frédéric Boissay and Russell Cooper

No 20703, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Active wholesale financial markets help reallocate deposits across heterogeneous banks. Because of incentive problems these flows are constrained and collateral is needed. The composition of collateral matters. The use of inside assets (loans) creates a “collateral pyramid” in that cash flows from one loan can be pledged to secure another. Through collateral pyramids the financial sector creates safe assets, but at the cost of exposing the economy to systemic panics. Outside collateral (treasuries) serves as foundation of, and stabilises, the pyramid. There is a threshold for the volume of treasuries, below which investors panic and the pyramid collapses.

JEL-codes: E44 E51 G21 G23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban and nep-mac
Note: EFG
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published as Frederic Boissay & Russell Cooper, 2016. "The Collateral Trap," BIS Working Papers 565, Bank for International Settlements.

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Working Paper: The Collateral Trap (2016)
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