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The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the NYC HS Match

Atila Abdulkadiroğlu, Nikhil Agarwal and Parag Pathak

No 21046, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Coordinated single-offer school assignment systems are a popular education reform. We show that uncoordinated offers in NYC’s school assignment mechanism generated mismatches. One-third of applicants were unassigned after the main round and later administratively placed at less desirable schools. We evaluate the effects of the new coordinated mechanism based on deferred acceptance using estimated student preferences. The new mechanism achieves 80% of the possible gains from a no-choice neighborhood extreme to a utilitarian benchmark. Coordinating offers dominates the effects of further algorithm modifications. Students most likely to be previously administratively assigned experienced the largest gains in welfare and subsequent achievement.

JEL-codes: C78 D47 D50 D61 I21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu, nep-gth, nep-upt and nep-ure
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Published as Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila, Nikhil Agarwal, and Parag A. Pathak. 2017. "The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match." American Economic Review, 107 (12): 3635-89. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20151425

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