Ghost-House Busters: The Electoral Response to a Large Anti Tax Evasion Program

Lorenzo Casaburi and Ugo antonio Troiano

No 21185, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The incentives of political agents to enforce tax collection are key determinants of the levels of compliance. We study the electoral response to the Ghost Buildings program, a nationwide anti-tax evasion policy in Italy that used innovative monitoring technologies to target buildings hidden from tax authorities. The program induced monetary and non-monetary benefits for non-evaders. A one standard deviation increase in town-level program intensity leads to a 4.8 percent increase in local incumbent reelection rates. In addition, these political returns are higher in areas with lower tax evasion tolerance and with higher efficiency of public good provision, implying complementarity among enforcement policies, the underlying tax culture, and the quality of the government.

JEL-codes: D72 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-iue, nep-pol and nep-pub
Note: PE POL
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

Published as Lorenzo Casaburi & Ugo Troiano, 2016. "Ghost-House Busters: The Electoral Response to a Large Anti–Tax Evasion Program," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 131(1), pages 273-314.

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Journal Article: Ghost-House Busters: The Electoral Response to a Large Anti–Tax Evasion Program (2016)
Working Paper: Ghost-House Busters: The Electoral Response to a Large Anti Tax Evasion Program (2013)
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