The Political Economy of European Integration

Enrico Spolaore

No 21250, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper discusses the process of European institutional integration from a political-economy perspective, linking the long-standing political debate on the nature of the European project to the recent economic literature on political integration and disintegration. First, we introduce the fundamental trade-off between economies of scale associated with larger political unions and the costs from sharing public goods and policies among more heterogeneous populations, and examine the implications of the trade-off for European integration. Second, we describe the two main political theories of European integration - intergovernmentalism and functionalism - and argue that both theories capture important aspects of European integration, but that neither view provides a complete and realistic interpretation of the process. Finally, we critically discuss the actual process of European institutional integration and its limits, from its beginnings after World War II to the current crisis.

JEL-codes: F02 F15 F5 H41 H56 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec, nep-int and nep-pol
Note: POL
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Published as Routledge Handbook of the Economics of European Integration, Chapter VII. Institutions 1.The Political Economy of European Integration (Enrico Spolaore)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Political Economy of European Integration (2015)
Working Paper: The Political Economy of European Integration (2015)
Working Paper: The Political Economy of European Integration (2014)
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