Subsidy Design in Privately-Provided Social Insurance: Lessons from Medicare Part D
Francesco Decarolis (),
Maria Polyakova () and
Stephen Ryan ()
No 21298, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
The efficiency of publicly-subsidized, privately-provisioned social insurance programs depends on the interaction between strategic insurers and the subsidy mechanism. We study this interaction in the context of Medicare's prescription drug coverage program. We find that the observed mechanism is successful in keeping "raise-the-subsidy" incentives relatively low, acts much like a at voucher, and obtains a level of welfare close to the optimal voucher. Across a range of counterfactuals, we find that more efficient subsidy mechanisms share three features: they retain the marginal elasticity of demand, limit the exercise of market power, and preserve the link between prices and marginal costs.
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