Why the Referential Treatment: Evidence from Field Experiments on Referrals

Amanda Pallais and Emily Glassberg Sands

No 21357, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Referred workers are more likely than non-referred workers to be hired, all else equal. In three field experiments in an online labor market, we examine why. We find that referrals contain positive information about worker performance and persistence that is not contained in workers' observable characteristics. We also find that referrals performed particularly well when working directly with their referrers. However, we do not find evidence that referrals exert more effort because they believe their performance will affect their relationship with their referrer or their referrer's position at the firm.

JEL-codes: C93 J24 J63 M51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-lma
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published as Amanda Pallais & Emily Glassberg Sands, 2016. "Why the Referential Treatment? Evidence from Field Experiments on Referrals," Journal of Political Economy, vol 124(6), pages 1793-1828.

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