When Is Social Responsibility Socially Desirable?

Jean-Etienne de Bettignies and David Robinson

No 21364, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We study a model in which corporate social responsibility (CSR) arises as a response to inefficient regulation. In our model, firms, governments, and workers interact. Firms generate profits but create negative spillovers that can be attenuated through government regulation, which is set endogenously and may or may not be socially optimal. Governments may choose suboptimal levels of regulation if they face lobbying pressure from companies. Companies can, in turn, hire socially responsible employees who enjoy taking actions to ameliorate the negative spillovers. Because firms can capture part of the rent created by allowing socially responsible employees to correct social ills, in some settings they find it optimal to lobby for inefficient rules and then capture the surplus associated with being "good citizens" in the face of bad regulation. In equilibrium, this means CSR can either increase or decrease social welfare, depending on the costs of political capture.

JEL-codes: D21 G30 H20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-reg
Note: CF
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published as When Is Social Responsibility Socially Desirable? Jean-Etienne de Bettignies and David T. Robinson Journal of Labor Economics 0 0:ja

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Journal Article: When Is Social Responsibility Socially Desirable? (2018)
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