EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Double Liability at Early American Banks

Howard Bodenhorn ()

No 21494, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Limited liability is a defining feature of the modern corporation, but it was not always so. By the early 1850s about one-half of all states imposed double liability on bank shareholders. This paper shows that double liability was adopted as deposits increased relative to banknotes and in conjunction with free banking; that double liability was associated with more concentrated bank shareholdings, but had little effect on share liquidity; that it increased the price of bank debt; and, that a regulatory change toward greater shareholder liability increased bank leverage ratios. In forcing bank shareholders to have more “skin in the game,” double liability changed bank investor, creditor and managerial behaviors.

JEL-codes: G21 K2 N21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his and nep-law
Note: CF DAE LE
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w21494.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21494

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w21494

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().

 
Page updated 2020-06-27
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21494