Training and Search On the Job

Rasmus Lentz and Nicolas Roys

No 21702, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The paper studies human capital accumulation over workers' careers in an on the job search setting with heterogenous firms. In renegotiation proof employment contracts, more productive firms provide more training. Both general and specific training induce higher wages within jobs, and with future employers, even conditional on the future employer type. Because matches do not internalize the specific capital loss from employer changes, specific human capital can be over-accumulated, more so in low type firms. While validating the Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) mechanisms, the analysis nevertheless arrives at the opposite conclusion: That increased labor market friction reduces training in equilibrium.

JEL-codes: D21 D43 D83 E24 J24 J31 J33 J41 J62 J63 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-dge, nep-hrm, nep-lab and nep-mac
Note: EFG
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

Published as Rasmus Lentz & Nicolas Roys, 2016. "Training and Search On the Job," Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Working Papers, vol 2016(025).

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w21702.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Training and Search On the Job (2024)
Working Paper: Training and Search on the Job (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21702

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w21702

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().