International Coordination and Precautionary Policies

Joshua Aizenman

No 21793, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper highlights the rare conditions leading to international cooperation, and the reasons why eliciting this cooperation may be beneficial in preventing adverse tail shocks from spiraling into global depressions. In normal times, deeper macro cooperation among countries is associated with welfare gains akin to Harberger’s second-order magnitude triangle, making the odds of cooperation low. When bad tail events induce imminent and correlated threats of destabilizing financial markets, the perceived losses have a first-order magnitude of terminating the total Marshalian surpluses. The apprehension of these losses in times of peril may elicit rare and beneficial macro cooperation. We close the paper by overviewing the obstacles preventing cooperation, and the proliferation of precautionary policies of emerging market economies as a second-best outcome of limited cooperation.

JEL-codes: F36 F41 F42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-ifn and nep-opm
Note: IFM
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published as Joshua Aizenman, 2016. "International Coordination and Precautionary Policies," International Economic Journal, vol 30(3), pages 379-391.

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