The Evolution of Culture and Institutions: Evidence from the Kuba Kingdom

Sara Lowes, Nathan Nunn, James Robinson and Jonathan Weigel

No 21798, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We use variation in historical state centralization to examine the impact of institutions on cultural norms. The Kuba Kingdom, established in Central Africa in the early 17th century by King Shyaam, had more developed state institutions than the other independent villages and chieftaincies in the region. It had an unwritten constitution, separation of political powers, a judicial system with courts and juries, a police force and military, taxation, and significant public goods provision. Comparing individuals from the Kuba Kingdom to those from just outside the Kingdom, we find that centralized formal institutions are associated with weaker norms of rule-following and a greater propensity to cheat for material gain.

JEL-codes: D03 N47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-gro, nep-his and nep-soc
Note: DAE DEV POL
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (35)

Published as Sara Lowes & Nathan Nunn & James A. Robinson & Jonathan L. Weigel, 2017. "The Evolution of Culture and Institutions: Evidence From the Kuba Kingdom," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85, pages 1065-1091, July.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w21798.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The Evolution of Culture and Institutions: Evidence From the Kuba Kingdom (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21798

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w21798

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().