Horizontal and Vertical Conflict: Experimental Evidence

Sebastian Galiani, Cheryl Long, Camila Navajas-Ahumada and Gustavo Torrens

No 21857, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Two types of political conflicts of interest pervade many of the world’s societies. A horizontal conflict of interest arises when different constituencies support different policies, while a vertical conflict of interest emerges when those in charge of running the government acquire and retain rents in the process of doing so. We experimentally explore the connections between the two. We identify two sets of models that incorporate both types of conflicts: electoral models with endogenous rents, and common-agency models. We adapt these models to a laboratory setting and test their main theoretical predictions using two experiments. In both cases we find support for the proposition that more intense horizontal conflict leads to higher rents, which is one of the theoretical predictions of the parametrized electoral and common-agency models that we have used.

JEL-codes: D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-pol
Note: DEV
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Published as Sebastian Galiani & Cheryl Long & Camila Navajas Ahumada & Gustavo Torrens, 2019. "Horizontal and Vertical Conflict: Experimental Evidence," Kyklos, vol 72(2), pages 239-269.

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Journal Article: Horizontal and Vertical Conflict: Experimental Evidence (2019)
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