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Private Equity's Unintended Dark Side: On the Economic Consequences of Excessive Delistings

Alexander Ljungqvist (alexander.ljungqvist@hhs.se), Lars Persson and Joacim Tåg

No 21909, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Over the past two decades, the U.S. stock market has been shrinking as the public firm model has begun to fall out of favor. We develop a political economy model of delistings to study the wider economic consequences of this trend. We show that the private and social incentives to delist firms from the stock market need not be aligned. Delistings can inadvertently impose an externality on the economy by reducing citizen-investors’ exposure to corporate profits and thereby undermining popular support for business-friendly policies. By facilitating companies’ departures from the stock market, private equity firms can trigger a chain of events that may lead to long-term reductions in aggregate investment, productivity, and employment.

JEL-codes: G24 G34 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-01
Note: CF POL
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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