Using Preference Estimates to Customize Incentives: An Application to Polio Vaccination Drives in Pakistan

James Andreoni, Michael Callen, Muhammad Khan, Karrar Jaffar and Charles Sprenger

No 22019, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We use estimates of time preferences to customize incentives for polio vaccinators in Lahore, Pakistan. We measure time preferences using intertemporal allocations of effort, and use these estimates to construct individually-tailored incentives. We evaluate the effect of matching contract terms to discounting parameters in a subsequent experiment with the same vaccinators. Our tailored policy is compared to alternatives that either rely on atheoretic reduced-form relationships for policy guidance or apply the same policy to all individuals. We find that contracts tailored to individual discounting outperform this range of policy alternatives.

JEL-codes: D03 I1 O1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea and nep-upt
Note: DEV POL
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

Published as James Andreoni & Michael Callen & Karrar Hussain & Muhammad Yasir Khan & Charles Sprenger, 2023. "Using Preference Estimates to Customize Incentives: An Application to Polio Vaccination Drives in Pakistan," Journal of the European Economic Association, vol 21(4), pages 1428-1477.

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Related works:
Journal Article: Using Preference Estimates to Customize Incentives: An Application to Polio Vaccination Drives in Pakistan (2023)
Working Paper: Using preference estimates to customize incentives: an application to Polio vaccination drives in Pakistan (2022)
Working Paper: Using Preference Estimates to Customize Incentives: An Application to Polio Vaccination Drives in Pakistan (2016)
Working Paper: Using Preference Estimates to Customize Incentives: An Application to Polio Vaccination Drives in Pakistan (2016)
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