Country Risk and the Organization of International Capital Transfer

Jonathan Eaton and Mark Gersovitz (m.gersovitz@jhu.edu)

No 2204, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Foreign portfolio investment is threatened by the risk of default and repudiation, while direct foreign investment is threatened by the risk of expropriation. These two contractual forms of investment can differ substantially in: (1) the amount of capital they can transfer from abroad to capital-importing countries; (2) the shadow cost of capital and (3) their implications for the tax policy of the host. The interaction of public borrowing from abroad with investments abroad by private citizens of the borrowing country can imply multiple equilibria with very different welfare consequences. One equilibrium involves private inflows and repayment of public debt. Another is characterized by capital flight and default.

Date: 1987-04
Note: ITI IFM
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

Published as Calvo, G., R. Findlay, P. Kouri and J. deMacedo (eds.) Debt, Stabilization and Development. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989.

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