Net Neutrality, Pricing Instruments and Incentives

Joshua Gans and Michael Katz ()

No 22040, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We correct and extend the results of Gans (2015) regarding the effects of net neutrality regulation on equilibrium outcomes in settings where a content provider sells its services to consumers for a fee. We examine both pricing and investment effects. We extend the earlier paper’s result that weak forms of net neutrality are ineffective and also show that even a strong form of net neutrality may be ineffective. In addition, we demonstrate that, when strong net neutrality does affect the equilibrium outcome, it may harm efficiency by distorting both ISP and content provider investment and service-quality choices.

JEL-codes: D4 D42 D43 L1 L12 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta, nep-mic, nep-net and nep-reg
Note: IO PR
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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