Selective Hearing: Physician-Ownership and Physicians' Response to New Evidence

David H. Howard, Guy David and Jason Hockenberry

No 22171, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Physicians, acting in their role as experts, are often faced with situations where they must trade off personal and patient welfare. Physicians’ incentives vary based on the organizational environment in which they practice. We use the publication of a major clinical trial, which found that a common knee operation does not improve outcomes for patients with osteoarthritis, as an “informational shock” to gauge the impact of physicians’ agency relationships on treatment decisions. Using a 100% sample of procedures in Florida from 1998 to 2010, we find that publication of the trial reduced procedure volume, but the magnitude of the decline was smaller in physician-owned surgery centers. Incentives affected physicians’ reactions to evidence.

JEL-codes: I11 L21 O33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pke
Note: EH
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published as David H. Howard & Guy David & Jason Hockenberry, 2016. "Selective Hearing: Physician-Ownership and Physicians’ Response to New Evidence," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, .

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w22171.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Selective Hearing: Physician‐Ownership and Physicians’ Response to New Evidence (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:22171

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w22171

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().