Democracy for Polarized Committees: The Tale of Blotto's Lieutenants

Alessandra Casella, Jean-François Laslier and Antonin Macé

No 22231, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: In polarized committees, majority voting disenfranchises the minority. Allowing voters to spend freely a fixed budget of votes over multiple issues restores some minority power. However, it also creates a complex strategic scenario: a hide-and-seek game between majority and minority voters that corresponds to a decentralized version of the Colonel Blotto game. We offer theoretical results and bring the game to the laboratory. The minority wins as frequently as theory predicts, despite subjects deviating from equilibrium strategies. Because subjects understand the logic of the game — minority voters must concentrate votes unpredictably — the exact choices are of secondary importance, a result that vouches for the robustness of the voting rule to strategic mistakes.

JEL-codes: C72 C92 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-pol
Note: POL
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published as Alessandra Casella & Jean-François Laslier & Antonin Macé, 2017. "Democracy for Polarized Committees: The Tale of Blotto's Lieutenants," Games and Economic Behavior, vol 106, pages 239-259.

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Related works:
Journal Article: Democracy for Polarized Committees: The Tale of Blotto's Lieutenants (2017)
Working Paper: Democracy for Polarized Committees: The Tale of Blotto's Lieutenants (2017)
Working Paper: Democracy for Polarized Committees: The Tale of Blotto's Lieutenants (2017)
Working Paper: Democracy for Polarized Committees: The Tale of Blotto's Lieutenants (2016)
Working Paper: Democracy for Polarized Committees. The Tale of Blotto's Lieutenants (2016)
Working Paper: Democracy for Polarized Committees: The Tale of Blotto's Lieutenants (2016)
Working Paper: Democracy for Polarized Committees: The Tale of Blotto's Lieutenants (2016)
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