The Consequences of Spatially Differentiated Water Pollution Regulation in China

Zhao Chen, Matthew Kahn, Yu Liu and Zhi Wang

No 22507, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: China’s environmental regulators have sought to reduce the Yangtze River’s water pollution. We document that this regulatory effort has had two unintended consequences. First, the regulation’s spatial differential stringency has displaced economic activity upstream. As polluting activity agglomerates upstream, more Pigouvian damage is caused downstream. Second, the regulation has focused on reducing one dimension of water pollution called chemical oxygen demand (COD). Thus, local officials face weak incentives to engage in costly effort to reduce other non-targeted but more harmful water pollutants such as petroleum, lead, mercury, and phenol.

JEL-codes: Q25 Q52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-cna, nep-env, nep-res and nep-tra
Note: EEE PE
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Published as Zhao Chen & Matthew E. Kahn & Yu Liu & Zhi Wang, 2018. "The consequences of spatially differentiated water pollution regulation in China," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, .

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Related works:
Journal Article: The consequences of spatially differentiated water pollution regulation in China (2018)
Working Paper: The Consequences of Spatially Differentiated Water Pollution Regulation in China (2016)
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