Family Descent as a Signal of Managerial Quality: Evidence from Mutual Funds
Oleg Chuprinin and
Denis Sosyura
No 22517, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Abstract:
We study the relation between mutual fund managers’ family backgrounds and their professional performance. Using hand-collected data from individual Census records on the wealth and income of managers’ parents, we find that managers from poor families deliver higher alphas than managers from rich families. This result is robust to alternative measures of fund performance, such as benchmark-adjusted return and value extracted from capital markets. We argue that managers born poor face higher entry barriers into asset management, and only the most skilled succeed. Consistent with this view, managers born rich are more likely to be promoted, while those born poor are promoted only if they outperform. Overall, we establish the first link between family descent of investment professionals and their ability to create value.
JEL-codes: D14 G23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn
Note: LS
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Citations:
Published as Oleg Chuprinin & Denis Sosyura, 2018. "Family Descent as a Signal of Managerial Quality: Evidence from Mutual Funds," The Review of Financial Studies, vol 31(10), pages 3756-3820.
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