EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Multilateral Trade Bargaining and Dominant Strategies

Kyle Bagwell and Robert Staiger ()

No 22842, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Motivated by GATT bargaining behavior and renegotiation rules, we construct a three-country, two-good general-equilibrium model of trade and examine multilateral tariff bargaining under the constraints of non-discrimination and multilateral reciprocity. We allow for a general family of government preferences and identify bargaining outcomes that can be implemented using dominant strategy proposals for all countries. In the implementation, tariff proposals are followed by multilateral rebalancing, a sequence that is broadly consistent with observed patterns identified by Bagwell, Staiger and Yurukoglu (2016) in the bargaining records for the GATT Torquay Round. The resulting bargaining outcome is efficient relative to government preferences if and only if the initial tariff vectors position the initial world price at its "politically optimal" level. In symmetric settings, if the initial tariffs correspond to Nash tariffs, then the resulting bargaining outcome is efficient and ensures greater-than-Nash trade volumes and welfares for all countries. We also highlight relationships between our work and previous research that examines strategy-proof rationing rules in other economic settings.

JEL-codes: D71 F02 F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int and nep-mic
Note: ITI
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Published as Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2018. "MULTILATERAL TRADE BARGAINING AND DOMINANT STRATEGIES," International Economic Review, vol 59(4), pages 1785-1824.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w22842.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: MULTILATERAL TRADE BARGAINING AND DOMINANT STRATEGIES (2018) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:22842

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w22842

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().

 
Page updated 2020-02-17
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:22842