Elections, Ideology, and Turnover in the U.S. Federal Government

Alexander Bolton, John M. de Figueiredo and David E. Lewis

No 22932, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: A defining feature of public sector employment is the regular change in elected leadership. Yet, we know little about how elections influence careers. We describe how elections can alter policy outputs and disrupt civil servants’ influence over agency decisions, potentially shaping their career choices. We use new data on federal career records between 1988 and 2011 to evaluate how elections influence turnover decisions. We find large levels of stability in the civil service but also pockets of employees that are responsive to presidential transitions. Senior career employees in agencies with views divergent from the president’s appear most affected. In the first three years of an administration, political factors such as elections, policy priorities, and political ideological differences, are estimated to increase turnover in the senior civil service by 30.9% in some agencies. We also find suggestive evidence that vacancies in high-level positions after elections may induce lower-level executives to stay longer in hopes of advancing.

JEL-codes: H11 H83 J45 J63 K29 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lma and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published as Alexander Bolton & John M. De Figueiredo & David Lewis, 2018. "Elections, Ideology, and Turnover in the U.S. Federal Government," Academy of Management Proceedings, vol 2018(1).

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