Social Ties and Favoritism in Chinese Science

Raymond Fisman, Jing Shi, Yongxiang Wang and Rong Xu ()

No 23130, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We study favoritism via hometown ties, a common source of favor exchange in China, in fellow selection of the Chinese Academies of Sciences and Engineering. Hometown ties to fellow selection committee members increase candidates' election probability by 39 percent, coming entirely from the selection stage involving an in-person meeting. Elected hometown-connected candidates are half as likely to have a high-impact publication as elected fellows without connections. CAS/CAE membership increases the probability of university leadership appointments and is associated with a US$9.5 million increase in annual funding for fellows' institutions, indicating that hometown favoritism has potentially large effects on resource allocation.

JEL-codes: J71 O3 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cna, nep-lma, nep-net, nep-pol and nep-soc
Note: DEV LS POL
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

Published as Raymond Fisman & Jing Shi & Yongxiang Wang & Rong Xu, 2018. "Social Ties and Favoritism in Chinese Science," Journal of Political Economy, vol 126(3), pages 1134-1171.

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Journal Article: Social Ties and Favoritism in Chinese Science (2018)
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