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Individuals and Organizations as Sources of State Effectiveness

Michael Best (), Jonas Hjort and David Szakonyi

No 23350, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: How important are bureaucrats for the productivity of the state? And to what extent do the tradeoffs between different policies depend on the implementing bureaucrats’ effectiveness? Using data on 16million public procurement purchases in Russia during 2011–2016, we show that over 40 percent of the variation in quality-adjusted prices paid—our measure of performance—is due to the individual bureaucrats and organizations that manage procurement processes. Such differences in effectiveness matter for policy design. To illustrate, we show that a common procurement policy— bid preferences for domestic suppliers—dramatically improves performance, but only when implemented by ineffective bureaucrats.

JEL-codes: H11 O2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cis
Note: DEV PE POL PR
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