All the President’s Friends: Political Access and Firm Value

Jeffrey Brown and Jiekun Huang

No 23356, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Using novel data on White House visitors from 2009 through 2015, we find that corporate executives’ meetings with key policymakers are associated with positive abnormal stock returns. We also find evidence suggesting that following meetings with federal government officials, firms receive more government contracts and are more likely to receive regulatory relief (as measured by the tone of regulatory news). The investment of these firms also becomes less affected by political uncertainty after the meetings. Using the 2016 presidential election as a shock to political access, we find that firms with access to the Obama administration experience significantly lower stock returns following the release of the election result than otherwise similar firms. Overall, our results provide evidence suggesting that political access is of significant value to corporations.

JEL-codes: G28 G3 H32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
Note: CF PE POL
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

Published as Jeffrey R. Brown & Jiekun Huang, 2020. "All the President's Friends: Political Access and Firm Value," Journal of Financial Economics, .

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