Market Power and Price Discrimination in the U.S. Market for Higher Education
Dennis Epple,
Richard Romano,
Sinan Sarpça,
Holger Sieg and
Melanie Zaber
No 23360, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Abstract:
The main purpose of this paper is to estimate an equilibrium model of private and public school competition that can generate realistic pricing patterns for private universities in the U.S. We show that the parameters of the model are identified and can be estimated using a semi-parametric estimator given data from the NPSAS. We find substantial price discrimination within colleges. We estimate that a $10,000 increase in family income increases tuition at private schools by on average $210 to $510. A one standard deviation increase in ability decreases tuition by approximately $920 to $1,960 depending on the selectivity of the college. Discounts for minority students range between $110 and $5,750.
JEL-codes: H52 I2 L3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-04
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Published as Dennis Epple & Richard Romano & Sinan Sarpça & Holger Sieg & Melanie Zaber, 2019. "Market power and price discrimination in the US market for higher education," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 50(1), pages 201-225, March.
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Journal Article: Market power and price discrimination in the US market for higher education (2019) 
Working Paper: Market Power and Price Discrimination in the U.S. Market for Higher Education (2017) 
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