Globalization and Executive Compensation

Wolfgang Keller and William Olney

No 23384, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper finds that globalization is contributing to the rapid increase in executive compensation over the last few decades. Employing comprehensive data on top executives at major U.S. companies, we show that their compensation is increasing with exports and foreign direct investment, as well as firm size and technology. Exogenous export shocks unrelated to managerial decisions also increase executive compensation, and there is little evidence that this is due to increasing market returns to talent. We do find that export shocks primarily affect discretionary forms of compensation of more powerful executives at firms with poor corporate governance, as one would expect if globalization has enhanced rent-capture opportunities. Overall, these results indicate that globalization has played a more central role in the rapid growth of executive compensation and U.S. inequality than previously thought.

JEL-codes: F14 J3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-hrm and nep-int
Note: ITI LS PR
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Published as Keller, Wolfgang & Olney, William W., 2021. "Globalization and executive compensation," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).

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Related works:
Journal Article: Globalization and executive compensation (2021)
Working Paper: Globalization and Executive Compensation (2018)
Working Paper: Globalization and Executive Compensation (2017)
Working Paper: Globalization and Executive Compensation (2017)
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