Asset Pricing in the Quest for the New El Dorado

Daniel Andrei and Bruce I. Carlin

No 23455, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Creative destruction not only involves bringing new technology to market, it imposes higher risk on the future of existing assets. We characterize the asset pricing implications of creative destruction when investors compete for market share. Compared to the social optimum, the quest for oligopoly rents leads to over-investment in uncertain projects, spikes in asset prices and risk premia, and an aftermath in which prices fall steeply as uncertainty resolves. These pricing patterns resemble a bubble ex post, but arise solely from competitive behavior and do not require information asymmetry, behavioral biases, or financial frictions. Our analysis yields novel empirical predictions and we discuss how financial innovation might be used to predict bubbles ex ante.

JEL-codes: G12 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm
Note: AP IO
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