An Overlapping Generations Model of Electoral Competition

Alberto Alesina and Stephen Spear ()

No 2354, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper presents a dynamic model of political competition between two "parties" with different policy preferences. A "party" is explicitly modeled as a sequence of overlapping generations of candidates, all of whom face finite decision horizons. In general, there is a conflict between the interests of the individual policymakers and those of the "party" , which includes subsequent generations of candidates. We characterize this conflict and suggest a scheme of "intergenerational transfers" within the party which can resolve or mitigate this conflict. The paper shows how the "overlapping generations" model can be usefully applied to the political arena.

Date: 1987-08
Note: ME
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

Published as Journal of Public Economics, vol.37, pp359-379, December 1988

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Journal Article: An overlapping generations model of electoral competition (1988)
Working Paper: An Overlapping Generations Model of Electoral Competition (1988)
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