Disclosure Rules and Declared Essential Patents

Rudi Bekkers, Christian Catalini, Arianna Martinelli, Cesare Righi and Timothy Simcoe

No 23627, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Many standard setting organizations (SSOs) require participants to disclose patents that might be infringed by implementing a proposed standard, and commit to license their “essential” patents on terms that are at least fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND). Data from these SSO intellectual property disclosures have been used in academic studies to provide a window into the standard setting process, and in legal proceedings to assess the relative contribution of different parties to a standard. We develop a simple model of the disclosure process to illustrate the link between SSO rules and patent-holder incentives, and examine the model's core predictions using a novel dataset constructed from the disclosure archives of thirteen major SSOs. The central message of the paper is that subtle differences in the rules used by different SSOs can influence which patents are disclosed, the terms of licensing commitments, and ultimately long-run citation and litigation rates for the underlying patents.

JEL-codes: D22 K2 K21 L15 L17 L24 L63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-law, nep-mic and nep-tid
Note: IO PR
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

Published as Rudi Bekkers & Christian Catalini & Arianna Martinelli & Cesare Righi & Timothy Simcoe, 2023. "Disclosure rules and declared essential patents," Research Policy, vol 52(1).

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