Learning by Ruling and Trade Disputes

Giovanni Maggi and Robert Staiger

No 23774, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Over the WTO years, the frequency of disputes and court rulings has trended downwards. Such trends are sometimes interpreted as symptoms of a dispute resolution system in decline. In this paper we propose a theory that can explain these trends as a result of judicial learning; thus according to our theory such trends represent good news, not bad news. We then offer evidence that the predictions of our model are consistent with WTO trade dispute data, and we take a first step towards estimating the strength and scope of court learning.

JEL-codes: D02 F13 K33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int
Note: ITI
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published as Giovanni Maggi & Robert W. Staiger, 2020. "Learning by ruling and trade disputes," Journal of International Economics, .

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