Democracy by mistake

Daniel Treisman

No 23944, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: How does democracy emerge from authoritarian rule? Influential theories contend that incumbents deliberately choose to share or surrender power. They do so to prevent revolution, motivate citizens to fight wars, incentivize governments to provide public goods, outbid elite rivals, or limit factional violence. Examining the history of all democratizations since 1800, I show that such deliberate choice arguments may help explain up to one third of cases. In about two thirds, democratization occurred not because incumbent elites chose it but because, in trying to prevent it, they made mistakes that weakened their hold on power. Common mistakes include: calling elections or starting military conflicts, only to lose them; ignoring popular unrest and being overthrown; initiating limited reforms that get out of hand; and selecting a covert democrat as leader. These mistakes reflect well-known cognitive biases such as overconfidence and the illusion of control.

JEL-codes: K00 N20 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-his, nep-hpe and nep-pol
Note: POL
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