The Gold Pool (1961-1968) and the Fall of the Bretton Woods System. Lessons for Central Bank Cooperation

Michael Bordo, Eric Monnet and Alain Naef

No 24016, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The Gold Pool (1961-1968) was one of the most ambitious cases of central bank cooperation in history. Major central banks pooled interventions – sharing profits and losses – to stabilize the dollar price of gold. Why did it collapse? From at least 1964, the fate of the Pool was in fact tied to sterling, the first line of defense for the dollar. Sterling’s unsuccessful devaluation in November 1967 spurred speculation and massive losses for the Pool. Contagion occurred because US policies were inflationary and insufficiently credible as well. The demise of the Pool provides a striking example of contagion between reserve currencies.

JEL-codes: E42 F31 F33 N14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-his, nep-mac, nep-mon and nep-pay
Note: ME
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published as Michael Bordo & Eric Monnet & Alain Naef, 2019. "The Gold Pool (1961–1968) and the Fall of the Bretton Woods System: Lessons for Central Bank Cooperation," The Journal of Economic History, vol 79(4), pages 1027-1059.

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Gold Pool (1961–1968) and the Fall of the Bretton Woods System: Lessons for Central Bank Cooperation (2019)
Working Paper: The Gold Pool (1961–1968) and the Fall of the Bretton Woods System: Lessons for Central Bank Cooperation (2019)
Working Paper: The Gold Pool (1961–1968) and the Fall of the Bretton Woods System: Lessons for Central Bank Cooperation (2019)
Working Paper: The Gold Pool (1961-1968) and the fall of the Bretton Woods system. Lessons for central bank cooperation (2017)
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